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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRYING TO HALT THE PROCEDURAL MERRY-GO-ROUND: THE
RIPENESS OF REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS AFTER
PALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLAND1

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a landowner had sought to develop his property by submitting a
proposed plan that conformed to all zoning and planning requirements, but the
relevant regulatory agency rejected his application. Suppose also that, along
with its denial, the agency indicated it would approve less intensive
development. Subsequently, the landowner submitted another application
seeking the exact level of development the agency indicated it would accept.
The landowner’s frustration would be understandable if the agency were to
deny this application as well, indicating once again that it would approve less
intensive development. If this very same exchange were to occur several
times, the landowner would probably feel justified turning to the courts for
protection of his or her constitutional right against a governmental taking
without compensation. Most would probably be surprised and outraged to
learn that even after this administrative run-around, the landowner could still
be denied his day in court. However, the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings
doctrine has allowed this very result to occur.2
While one may be tempted to dismiss it as “merely” a procedural
requirement, the issue of ripeness can have a profound effect on the
enforcement of constitutional rights. Ripeness doctrine serves as a gatekeeper
to the court system by dictating when a claim may be brought.3 By preventing

1. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
2. This hypothetical scenario was adapted from the facts of Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd. v. City of Monterey. 920 F.2d 1496, 1502 (9th Cir. 1990). In Del Monte Dunes, a judge of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a landowner’s
claim as unripe after a similar administrative history. Id. at 1500. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed this judgment of the district court. Id. at 1509.
The case nevertheless demonstrates the potentially harmful power of the Supreme Court’s
regulatory takings ripeness doctrine.
3. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4.1, at 114 (3d ed. 1999) (stating
that ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that determines when review is appropriate); see also
Marla E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The Supreme Court’s “Hypothetical”
Barriers, 68 N.D. L. REV. 1, 68 (1992) (explaining that while “standing” deals with the “who” of
a lawsuit, “ripeness” deals with the “when”).
833
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premature adjudication,4 ripeness doctrine maintains “the limits on judicial
power appropriate in a democratic society.”5 While ripeness requirements
affect all constitutional claims, they have a particularly significant role in
regulatory takings claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.6 The Supreme Court’s regulatory takings ripeness doctrine states
that before a landowner is able to bring a takings claim in court he must first
obtain a “final decision” regarding the application of a challenged regulation to
his or her property, and, second, he must utilize any available state procedures
for obtaining just compensation.7 The requirement of obtaining a “final
decision,” also known as “finality ripeness,” enables a court to determine the
extent of a regulation’s application.8 In a regulatory takings claim, this is
crucial because such a taking can occur only where a government regulation
goes “too far.”9
At different points in its development, finality ripeness doctrine has taken
on different “shades.” These shades have reflected what the Court has
considered to be the appropriate limits on judicial power or, alternatively, what
the Court has viewed as the judicial system’s proper role.10 The Court’s initial
4. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). In Abbott, the Court
explained that the basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
challenging parties.” Id. at 148-49.
5. Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In Navegar, the
court noted that Article III justiciability principles serve “several important functions, not the
least of which are maintaining the limits on judicial power appropriate in a democratic society.”
Id. at 997-98. See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (explaining that “[f]ederal judicial
power is limited to those disputes which confine federal courts to a rule consistent with a system
of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the
judicial process”).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment V states, in relevant part, “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Id.
7. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
8. The Court’s ripeness decision in Palazzolo addressed only what is required to obtain a
final decision; therefore, this Note will focus upon the finality ripeness requirements since the
Constitution forbids only governmental taking without just compensation. See supra note 6. As
a result, the second part of the Williamson County test, exhaustion of state compensation
procedures, is also crucial to determining whether there has been a violation of constitutional
rights in a specific instance. As with finality ripeness requirements, this second part of the
Williamson County test has given rise to several issues. For a brief discussion of these issues, see
infra note 118.
9. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). According to Justice
Holmes, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.” Id.
10. See discussion supra at note 5.
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finality ripeness decisions reflected its respect for the autonomy and discretion
of regulatory agencies by encouraging negotiation between landowners and
regulatory agencies.11 To do so, the Court’s decisions required landowners to
apply for variances and to make additional applications even after agencies had
denied earlier applications.12 These requirements, while well-intentioned,
created a procedural merry-go-round that prevented landowners from being
able to bring regulatory takings claims to court. This tilted the balance of
power between regulatory agencies and landowners in favor of regulatory
agencies, placing the legitimate rights of landowners at risk.13 In response, the
Court altered the “shade” of its takings ripeness doctrine so as to provide more
protection for landowners’ rights.14 Prior to its 2001 term, the Court’s recent
decisions had indicated that it was more inclined to hold a landowner’s
regulatory takings claim to be ripe, but they did not completely halt the
procedural merry-go-round. The Court once again addressed this problem in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.15 While not fundamentally changing the takings
ripeness doctrine, Palazzolo continues the Court’s trend of finding regulatory
takings claims to be ripe, and it offers much-needed protection for landowner’s
rights by indicating that courts should hold a takings claim to be ripe under a
wider range of circumstances. However, vagueness in the Court’s decision
may ultimately leave both landowners and regulatory agencies dissatisfied with
the status of the takings ripeness doctrine.
Part II of this Note discusses the development of the Court’s regulatory
takings ripeness doctrine, and Part III addresses the problems that have arisen
under the Court’s previous takings ripeness decisions. Part IV examines in
detail the Court’s decision in Palazzolo. Part V discusses how Palazzolo
indicates that courts should hold claims to be ripe under broader
circumstances, resulting in increased protection for the constitutional rights of
landowners, and how, because of its shortcomings, Palazzolo may leave both
landowners and regulatory agencies dissatisfied.

11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See, e.g., Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193-94 (holding that a claim is not ripe until a
landowner has pursued available variances); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Co., 477 U.S.
340, 353 n.9 (1986) (indicating that to ripen a claim after denial of an initial application, a
landowner should submit additional, less intensive applications).
13. See infra Part II.C.2.
14. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 n.3 (1992)
(stating that it would be “pointless” for the landowner to submit an application for development);
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997) (stating that “no occasion
exist[ed] for applying Williamson County’s requirement [of a ‘final decision’]”).
15. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAKINGS RIPENESS DOCTRINE
A.

The Court’s General Ripeness Doctrine

The Court’s regulatory ripeness doctrine is distinct from the Court’s
general ripeness doctrine.16 As expected, however, the history and function of
the latter provides insight into the role and purpose of the former. In general,
ripeness addresses the “conditions that must exist before a dispute is
sufficiently mature to enable a court to decide a case on the merits.”17 As the
Court has explained, “[r]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing.”18
Therefore, when a claimant brings his claim prematurely, it will be found
nonjusticiable and barred from court.19
Both constitutional and prudential principles provide support for the
ripeness doctrine.20 First, the Constitution limits federal courts’ review to true

16. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733-44 (discussing the Court’s general ripeness doctrine and its
takings ripeness doctrine in separate sections); see also Max Kidalov and Richard H. Seamon,
The Missing Pieces of the Debate Over Federal Property Rights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 8 (1999) (noting that the various names of the takings ripeness doctrine reflect the
doctrine’s distinctness from the Court’s general doctrine of ripeness); Timothy V. Kassouni, The
Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (stating that the Court has developed a “special ripeness doctrine
applicable only to constitutional property rights claims”).
17. Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The Florida
Private Property Rights Protection Act, 47 FLA. L. REV. 411, 416 (1995). While varying slightly
in their enunciation, other authorities define ripeness in a similar fashion. See, e.g., JACOB A.
STEIN ET AL., 5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 48.01, at 48-3 (1988 revision) (citations omitted)
(noting that despite having no precise definition, the concept of ripeness “involves determining
whether decisions of a particular agency are at a stage which permits judicial resolution”);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ripeness as being “[t]he circumstance
existing when a case has reached, but has not yet passed, the point when the facts have developed
sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made”).
18. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974).
19. Julia C. Haffner, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: The United States
Supreme Court Revisits Ripeness in the Regulatory Takings Context, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 129,
132 (1997) (stating that “[f]indings of nonjusticibility usually arise when a plaintiff prematurely
challenges the constitutionality of a regulatory scheme”). According to one commentator:
The issue of ripeness is jurisdictional in nature. The Supreme Court has consistently held
that it has no jurisdiction to hear unripe claims and has dismissed attempts by landowners
to force the Court to grant jurisdiction to adjudicate unfinal judgments. Specifically,
ripeness is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction and is a pure legal question to be decided
by the court. That is, a court cannot decide the merits of a case until the plaintiff has
ripened its claim.
Michael K. Whitman, The Ripeness Doctrine in the Land-Use Context: The Municipality’s Ally
and the Landowner’s Nemesis, 29 URB. LAW. 13, 20-21 (1997) (citations omitted).
20. See Mansfield, supra note 3, at 68; see also 58 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 135 (2000)
(noting that “‘ripeness’ in takings jurisprudence is a blend of constitutional and prudential
concepts”). As one commentator has explained:
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cases and controversies only.21 Therefore, if a claim is brought before a true
“case” or “controversy” has formed, it is not ripe, and a court cannot hear it.
Second, as a prudential matter, a court cannot properly adjudicate a case if the
record before it is incomplete.22 Thus, by avoiding premature adjudication,
ripeness doctrine prevents courts from becoming entangled “in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies,”23 and assists courts “in gaining a
firmer factual footing.” 24
A court might also find it desirable to hold a claim to be unripe even where
the record is fully developed.25 For example, a court may wish to protect
regulatory agencies from judicial interference until agencies arrive at their

It has been said that there are two reasons why federal courts in particular should not hear
unripe claims. First, Article III courts are constitutionally limited to deciding cases or
controversies under Article III of the Constitution. Second, prudent courts do not wish to
reach speculative decisions based upon incomplete records.
Whitman, supra note 19, at 23 (citations omitted).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more
States;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
22. See Kevin J. Cross, Just a Little Longer Mrs. Suitum, Your Case is Just About Ripe for
Review: Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 444 (1998); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 2.4.1. at 117 (explaining that the purpose of the ripeness
doctrine is to improve the quality of judicial decision by requiring adequate records and
statements of facts as prerequisites of review). According to one commentator, “most courts
would rather avoid speculative cases, defer to finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise,
decide cases with fully-developed records, and avoid overly broad opinions, even if these courts
might constitutionally hear a dispute.” Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the
Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995).
23. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); see also Mansfield,
supra note 3, at 68.
24. See Mansfield, supra note 3, at 22.
25. According to Justice Brandeis, “[t]he Court [has] developed, for its own governance in
the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing
upon a large part of all the constitutional question pressed upon it for decision.” Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Commentators
have also noted the Court’s voluntary restraint. See Maraist, supra note 17, at 418 (noting that
“[t]he prudential aspect of ripeness is also utilized by the judiciary to refrain from deciding cases
that are within the court’s jurisdiction but are nonetheless inappropriate for judicial review”); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 2.1 at 42 (noting that even though the Constitution permits
federal court adjudication, some courts have decided that proper policy motives require no review
in some cases).
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decisions.26 As Alexander Bickel argued, the Court should utilize ripeness
doctrine, which he referred to as one of the “passive virtues,” to avoid judicial
decision-making where it is more appropriate for another branch of the
government to take action first.27 Such restraint enables other branches of
government the opportunity to function,28 which in turn maintains “the limits
on judicial power appropriate in a democratic society.”29
At varying times and in varying situations, the Court has utilized ripeness
doctrine to further such policy goals. For example, early ripeness cases held
that a claim was ripe for review only when private parties were impacted
directly.30 In the 1930s, the Court utilized this restrictive approach to ripeness

26. See Abbott Labs., Inc., 387 U.S. at 148-49; see also Mansfield, supra note 3, at 68.
27. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-198 (1st ed. 1962) (discussing the “passive
virtues”). According to Bickel:
[E]ven in a perfectly real, concrete, and fully developed controversy, [the office of the
Court] is not necessarily to resolve issues on which the political processes are in deadlock;
it may be wise to wait till the political institutions, breaking the deadlock, are able to
make an initial decision, on which the Court may then pass judgment.
Id. at 146. Bickel believed that under the Constitutional system of government, the power of
initial decision belongs to the legislature; therefore, “it is quite wrong for the Court to relieve
[people] of [the] burden of self-government.” Id. at 156.
28. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 178
(1987) (stating that “ripeness . . . allows courts to postpone interfering when necessary so that
other branches of government . . . may perform their functions unimpeded”); see also Mansfield,
supra note 3, at 22 (stating that “[r]ipeness doctrine can allow other branches of government the
opportunity to work”).
29. See supra note 5; see also Robert F. Frelich, Administrative Remedies for Unduly Harsh
Regulation, 11 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 655, 665 (stating that ripeness doctrine “protects the administrative
agency’s autonomy by allowing them to correct its own errors, thus ensuring that individuals are
not encouraged to ignore its procedures and resort directly to courts”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10
(1927) (concluding that the “so-called” order being challenged was not subject to judicial review
because it did not command the plaintiff to do or not do anything); see also Mansfield, supra note
3, at 20.
The Court moved away from this strict conception of its general ripeness doctrine in
1967. In Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, the Court established a two-part test for its
general ripeness doctrine requiring an evaluation of “both the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” 387 U.S. 136, 149
(1967). The first prong addresses whether the question presented by the claim is one of law. See,
e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 201 (1983); see also Mansfield, supra note 3 at 69. The second prong contemplates the
difficulties that either prompt or delayed review would create for either the private party or the
agency. See, e.g., Lotz Realty Co. v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 692, 697 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(holding that decision is not final because judicial action would divert manpower from an
agency’s normal functions, thereby burdening the agency). According to one commentator, the
two-part Abbott formula allows for more flexible results than the Court’s earlier ripeness
decisions. See Mansfield, supra note 3, at 70.
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to protect New Deal social programs from attack.31 Many claimants were
unable to pass the high threshold of ripeness, which made it difficult to
challenge these legislative programs or the regulations promulgated
thereunder. By limiting its power to what it believed appropriate, the Court
shifted power from itself to legislative and administrative agencies. Such use
of the ripeness doctrine closely resembles the manner in which ripeness came
to be used in the context of regulatory takings claims.
B.

The Role of Ripeness in Regulatory Takings Claims

To understand the role of ripeness in regulatory takings claims, one must
first understand the nature of regulatory takings claims.32 The Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment permits the government to seize private property for
public use, provided that it pays the owner “just compensation.”33 The Court
As discussed previously, the Court’s ripeness doctrine in the regulatory takings context
has diverged from its general ripeness doctrine. See discussion supra note 16. While the Court’s
general ripeness doctrine has become more flexible, until recently the Court’s takings ripeness
doctrine has been formalistic. See Kassouni, supra note 16, at 2 (arguing that “the Supreme
Court’s traditional conception of ripeness bears little resemblance to the formalistic test
applicable to constitutional property rights”). Kassouni also noted that Abbott Laboratories “has
been largely ignored when constitutional property rights are at issue.” Id. at 3. Another
commentator has suggested that this divergence is due to the nature of the claims addressed under
the ripeness doctrine. See Nichol, supra note 28, at 165 (noting that “[t]he ripeness requirement
consistently has been molded to meet the dictates of the substantive claim on the merits”). As
Professor Nichol explained, the Court has allowed pre-enforcement challenges to laws regulating,
for instance, speech because such laws “chill” potential speech. Id. at 165-66. However, since
Fifth Amendment takings claims turn on “ad hoc factual determinations directed to particular
estimates of the economic impact on the property in question,” the Court has ruled that it is
particularly important that adjudication take place in a concrete factual setting. Id. at 166.
31. See Mansfield, supra note 3, at 20 (characterizing the approach to ripeness by justices
committed to the New Deal social experiment as “restricted”). Professor Mansfield explained
that “[u]ntil an agency has actually acted against a party, the potential plaintiff would,
unfortunately have to choose between changing behavior or risking sanctions.” Id. at 21.
32. There are three separate constitutional claims that landowners may employ in defense of
their property rights: Fifth Amendment just compensation claims, due process claims, and equal
protection claims. See Kassouni, supra note 16, at 3. Kassouni argued that ripeness doctrine as
applied to regulatory takings is inapplicable to substantive due process and equal protection
claims. See Kassouni, supra note 16, at 44-47. Leaving aside whether this argument is correct,
this Note focuses upon the Court’s takings ripeness jurisprudence in only Fifth Amendment just
compensation claims.
33. See discussion supra note 6. The Takings Clause is applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897). The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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first recognized that the Fifth Amendment requirement of just compensation
extends beyond physical seizures to limitations imposed by governmental
regulation in its 1922 decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.34 The
Court held in Pennsylvania Coal “that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”35
While it established the existence of regulatory takings, Pennsylvania Coal
provided little guidance as to how far a regulation could go before it went “too
far.”36
During the fifty-five years following Pennsylvania Coal, the Court did
little to elaborate on the concept of regulatory takings.37 Beginning in the late
1970s, however, the Court returned to this arena with vigor.38 This renewed
interest was fueled by a shift in the nature of governmental regulations. After
World War II, governments utilized land-use regulations to further “novel
societal goals,” such as historic preservation, open space preservation and

34. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
35. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
36. In the Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Scalia
stated that “our decision in Mahon offered little insight into when, and under what circumstances,
a given regulation would be seen as going ‘too far’ for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
37. See ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE 6 (1st ed. 1999). As Meltz explained,
in the late 1930s the Supreme Court abandoned “the close constitutional scrutiny . . . that had
characterized the first decades of the century. Given the new hands-off approach, it was only
natural that takings challenges to regulatory control of property should be disfavored.” Id. In
further explaining the dearth of regulatory takings decisions, Meltz stated that in the 1950s and
1960s, the Warren Court focused on parts of the Bill of Rights concerned with individual
liberties, rather than property rights. Id.
38. Id. Upon returning to the arena of regulatory takings claims, the Court’s decisions have
developed two separate types of claims. The first type of claim was outlined in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and includes “circumstances where the
application of a regulation to particular property is a taking of some interest in property that is
less than the whole, although the regulation may not effect a taking on its face.” Wendie L.
Kellington, New Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, SG021 ALI-ABA 511, 514 (2001).
Penn Central claims involve considering three factors: first, “the character of the invasion,
[second,] the economic impact of the regulation as applied to the particular property, and [third,]
the property owner’s distinct investment backed expectations with respect to that property.” Id. at
514-15. For a detailed discussion of this type of claim, see STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY
TAKINGS § 6-4 (1st ed. 1996). The second type is a categorical claim where the deprivation of all
economically beneficial use is alleged. See Kellington, supra at 513. This claim was established
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Lucas claims for just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment have two essential elements. See Kellington, supra at
514. First, the imposition of a regulation must totally deprive a landowner of a right in property,
and, second, the right deprived must be recognized under state law and must not be a nuisance.
Id. Again, for a more detailed discussion of this type of claim, see EAGLE, supra at § 7-6. As
discussed infra, both types of claims played a role in the Court’s decision in Palazzolo, despite
the fact that the petitioner raised only a Lucas claim.
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growth control.39 The 1960s and 1970s saw governments enact many
environmental regulations.40 These regulations restricted the permissible uses
and development of landowners’ property, which led many landowners to seek
compensation through regulatory takings claims. Confronted with the
increased number of regulatory takings claims, the Court began to develop its
regulatory takings ripeness doctrine.
In some respects, ripeness doctrine serves the same function in regulatory
takings claims as it does in other contexts. It prevents premature adjudication
of disagreements with administrative policies,41 thereby ensuring the
development of a factual record that will enable a court to determine whether a
taking has occurred.42 This function is especially important in regulatory
takings claims, which turn on “ad hoc factual determinations directed to
particular estimates of the economic impact on the property in question.”43
However, beyond this role, ripeness doctrine also serves an additional, unique
function in regulatory takings claims. As the Court has recognized, regulatory
agency land-use decisions are subject to change and compromise.44 By
requiring claims to be ripe before adjudication, ripeness doctrine ensures there
is adequate time and flexibility for the parties to reach a mutually acceptable
resolution.45 Ripeness doctrine “sends the municipality a clear message that
the landowner is serious about challenging [a] regulation before the case winds
up in court, allowing [a regulatory agency] time to effect a possible

39. See MELTZ, supra note 37, at 7.
40. Id. Meltz noted that “[t]hese new generations of controls . . . undoubtedly raised the
judicial eyebrow. Preserving ecosystems, in the contemporary mainstream ethic that courts
inevitably reflect, does not rank with zoning adult bookstores out of residential neighborhoods.”
Id.
41. See Michael B. Hitchcock, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: Applying the
Takings Ripeness Rule to Land Use Regulations and Transferable Development Rights, 28
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 87, 93 (1998) (noting that the takings “ripeness doctrine functions to
avoid premature adjudication of disagreements with administrative policies”).
42. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The
Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 (1999); see also Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So.2d 523, 525
(1994) (noting that the ripeness doctrine “enables a court to determine whether a takings has
occurred and, if so, its extent”).
43. See Nichol, supra note 28, at 166.
44. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Co., 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986) (stating that
“[t]he local agencies charged with administering regulations governing property development are
singularly flexible institutions; what they take with the one hand they may give back with the
other”).
45. See Robert P. Butts, Private Property Rights in Florida: Is Legislation the Best
Alternative?, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 247, 262 (1997) (stating that ripeness doctrine
recognizes that “given time, the parties will reach a political or administrative resolution”); see
also Freilich, supra note 29, at 664 (stating that ripeness doctrine “provides flexibility for the
negotiation of land use disputes prior to resorting to judicial review”).
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compromise.”46 It ensures that the parties have one last opportunity to resolve
their differences “before resorting to the expense, delay and aggravation of
lawsuits.”47 The practical benefits of negotiation to the parties are clear.
Negotiation also provides a regulatory agency the opportunity to exercise its
powers of discretion before a court interferes with the application of the
agency’s rules. Therefore, utilizing ripeness to encourage negotiation also
maintains the proper limit on judicial power.
C. Judicial Development of the Takings Ripeness Doctrine
The Court’s initial takings ripeness decisions sought to promote
negotiation between landowners and regulatory agencies by requiring
landowners to pursue variances and submit additional applications. This
approach to the ripeness doctrine reflected the Court’s desire to respect the
autonomy and discretion of regulatory agencies, and thereby maintain the
appropriate limits on judicial power as the Court had done in the 1930s.
However, the Court’s efforts to encourage this negotiation between landowners
and regulatory agencies placed the legitimate rights of landowners in jeopardy.
As a result, the Court’s recent ripeness doctrine decisions have reflected an
inclination to find claims to be ripe, which offers landowners some protection
by enabling them to litigate their takings claims at an earlier point in the
procedural process.
1.

Initial Decisions: Putting the Merry-Go-Round into Motion

In 1978, the Court issued its landmark regulatory takings decision in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.48 In Penn Central, the Court
rejected a landowner’s challenge to a regulation that prohibited construction of
an office building above Grand Central Station. The Court reasoned that this
did not amount to a regulatory taking because other beneficial uses of the site
remained.49 In rejecting the claim, the Court also noted that the landowners
46. John Mixon & Justin Waggoner, The Role of Variances in Determining Ripeness in
Takings Claims Under Zoning Ordinances and Subdivision Regulations of Texas Municipalities,
29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 765, 774 (1998). Mixon and Waggoner argued that this additional time
“should increase the likelihood that the city attorney will educate the governing body and board
of adjustment on the necessity of looking at the classification, assessing its reasonableness, and
weighing its value against the chance of substantial monetary loss.” Id. Lastly, they noted that
the “procedure can shift the municipality’s focus away from . . . public health, safety and
welfare . . . , towards consideration of the impact such regulations are likely to have on a
particular landowner.” Id. at 774-75.
47. Id. at 775.
48. 438 U.S 104 (1978).
49. Id. at 138. The Court stated:
On this record, we conclude that the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law has
not effected a “taking” of appellants’ property. The restrictions imposed are substantially
related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial
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had not applied for approval of a smaller structure.50 Some have argued this
provided the foundation for the Court’s subsequent ripeness requirements that
an applicant modify or resubmit a proposal before a takings claim will be
considered.51
Two years later, the Court decided Agins v. City of Tiburon.52 In Agins,
the Court indicated that the regulatory takings claim before it was unripe
because the landowners had never actually sought approval for development of
their land under the challenged regulations.53 The Court reaffirmed Agins the
following year in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.54 In San
Diego Gas, the Court again rejected a regulatory takings appeal because the
landowner had never submitted a development plan. As the Court noted, its

use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not
only the Terminal site proper but also other properties.
Id.
50. Id. at 137. The Court stated that, “Counsel for appellants admitted at oral argument that
the Commission ha[d] not suggested that it would not, for example, approve a 20-story office
tower along the lines of that which was part of the original plan for the Terminal.” Id. at 137
n.34.
51. See, e.g., Hitchcock, supra note 41, at 95 (stating that Penn Central Transp. Co.
“provided the foundation for subsequent requirements that an applicant, whose development
proposal was denied, modify or resubmit the application before a case is ripe”); Maraist, supra
note 17, at 422 (stating that the Court’s decision “paved the way for subsequent requirements that
an applicant modify or resubmit a proposal before a case is ripe”).
52. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, the city of Tiburon, California adopted two ordinances
that modified existing zoning requirements after the landowners had acquired five acres of
unimproved land in the city. Id. at 257. Specifically, the ordinances restricted the developments
that the landowners were allowed to undertake to one-family dwellings. Id. Without ever
seeking approval for development of their land under the zoning ordinances, the landowners filed
a two-part complaint seeking: (1) two million dollars for inverse condemnation; and (2) a
declaration that that zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional. Id. at 257-58.
53. Id. 447 U.S. at 260. The Court stated:
Because the appellants have not submitted a plan for development of their property as the
ordinances permit, there is as of yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of
the specific zoning provisions. . . . Thus, the only question properly before us is whether
the mere enactment of the zoning ordinances constitutes a taking.
Id. Note that, while failure to submit a plan for development rendered the appellants’ as applied
takings claim unripe, the Court also indicated that a facial challenge to a regulation is ripe from
the moment such regulation is enacted. Id. The Court has also made it clear that a landowner
making a facial takings claim is not subject to finality ripeness requirements because, by
definition, the mere enactment of the law, and not its application, takes the property. Yee v. City
of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992).
54. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). In San Diego Gas, a landowner purchased in 1966 a 412-acre
parcel of land in an area in the northwest part of San Diego, California as a possible site for a
nuclear power plant to be constructed in the 1980s. Id. at 624-25. However, in 1973, the city
rezoned part of the landowner’s property and established an open-space plan. Id. Subsequently,
the landowner filed suit seeking damages for inverse condemnation, mandamus and declaratory
relief. Id. at 626.
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review was limited to “‘final judgments or decrees’ of a state court;” since no
proposal was ever submitted, the Court of Appeals was unable to issue a final
decision as to whether there had been any taking.55 Thus, the Court’s decision
indicated that to ripen a regulatory takings claim, landowners must submit a
development plan and subsequently have it rejected.56 During that same year,
the Court also decided Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association.57 Although the Court did not rest its decision in Hodel on
ripeness doctrine, the Court did address a ripeness issue. Specifically, the

55. Id. at 633. As the Court of Appeal explained:
[Appellant] complains that it has been denied all use of its land which is zoned for
agriculture and manufacturing but lies within the open space area of the general plan. It
has not made application to use or improve the property nor has it asked [the] City what
development might be permitted. Even assuming no use is acceptable to the City,
[appellant’s] complaint deals with the alleged overzealous use of the police power by
[the] City. Its remedy is mandamus or declaratory relief, not inverse condemnation.
[Appellant] did in its complaint seek these remedies asserting that [the] City had
arbitrarily exercised its police power by enacting an unconstitutional zoning law and
general plan element or by applying the zoning and general plan unconstitutionally.
However, on the present record these are disputed fact issues not covered by the trial court
in its findings and conclusions. They can be dealt with anew should [appellant] elect to
retry the case.
Id. at 630.
56. One commentator has concluded that, “[i]n Agins, the Court had suggested to the
landowners that they return to federal court after an application had been rejected. In San Diego
Gas, the Court transformed that suggestion into a required first step in an as-applied takings
claim.” See Stein, supra note 22, at 21.
57. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). In Hodel, coal producers and landowners challenged the
enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. Id. at 273. Specifically,
the plaintiffs’ claim was directed at the sections of the Act establishing its interim regulatory
program, which they contended violated, among other constitutional provisions, the just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 273. Since the claim brought was a facial
challenge, the Court did not confront the same type of ripeness difficulties as in as-applied cases.
The Court stated:
Because appellees’ taking claim arose in the context of a facial challenge, it presented no
concrete controversy concerning either application of the Act to particular surface mining
operations or its effect on specific parcels of land. Thus, the only issue properly before
the District Court and, in turn, this Court, is whether the ‘mere enactment’ of the Surface
Mining Act constitutes a taking. . . . The test to be applied in considering this facial
challenge is fairly straightforward. A statute regulating the uses that can be made of
property effects a taking if it ‘denies an owner economically viable use of his land . . .’
. . . The Surface Mining Act easily survives scrutiny under this test.
Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted). The Court held, in part because the Surface Mining Act did not
facially prevent beneficial use of coal-bearing land, that there was no reason to suppose that the
“mere enactment” of the Surface Mining Act had deprived appellees of economically viable use
of their property. Id. at 296-97.
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Court indicated that where a regulation provides possible variances from its
requirements, a landowner should pursue such variances to ripen his claim.58
The regulatory takings ripeness doctrine began to crystallize in the Court’s
1985 decision of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.59 In Williamson County, the Court established
its two-part test for ripeness. This test requires a landowner, first, to obtain a
final decision regarding the application of the challenged regulations to his
property, and, second, to utilize any available state procedures for obtaining
just compensation.60 In Williamson County, the Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission (“Commission”) amended its zoning ordinances after a
commercial landowner had begun constructing a residential subdivision on its
property.61 Because the Commission eventually denied the landowner’s
applications to complete the development for reasons related to the zoning
ordinance changes, the landowner brought a regulatory takings claim.62
However, the Court concluded that the landowner’s regulatory takings claim
was unripe and refused to address the merits of the complaint.63
Under the first part of its ripeness test, the Court held that the landowner
had not obtained a final decision regarding how it would be allowed to develop
its property64 because the landowner had not sought variances that would have
58. See id. at 297. The Court stated:
[A]ppellees cannot at this juncture legitimately raise complaints in this Court about the
manner in which the challenged provisions of the Act have been or will be applied in
specific circumstances, or about their effect on particular coal mining operations. There is
no indication in the record that appellees have availed themselves of the opportunities
provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by requesting either a variance . . . or a
waiver . . . . If appellees were to seek administrative relief under these procedures, a
mutually acceptable solution might well be reached with regard to individual properties
thereby obviating any need to address the constitutional questions. The potential for such
administrative solutions confirms that conclusion that the taking issue decided by the
District Court simply is not ripe for judicial resolution.
Id.
59. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
60. Id. at 186. The Court stated that, “[b]ecause respondent has not yet obtained a final
decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its
property, nor utilized the procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation,
respondent’s claim is not ripe.” Id.
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id. at 181-82. The Commission based its denial on reasons including density problems,
road grades, lack of fire protection and minimum frontages. See id.
63. Id. at 185.
64. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 190. Specifically, the Court stated:
The Commission’s regulations clearly indicated that unless a developer applied for a
variance in writing and upon notice to other property owners, “any condition shown on
the plat which would require a variance will constitute grounds for disapproval of the
plat.” Thus, in the face of respondent’s refusal to follow the procedures for requesting a
variance, and its refusal to provide specific information about the variances it would
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allowed it to develop the property according to its proposed plat.65 Thus,
Williamson County transformed into a finality ripeness requirement Hodel’s
suggestion that a landowner pursue a variance where possible.66 Under the
second part of the ripeness test, the Court noted that the landowner “did not
seek compensation through the procedures the State [had] provided for doing
so.”67 The Court explained this was necessary to ripen a takings claim
because, until a landowner has sought and been denied compensation, he
cannot claim a violation of the Takings Clause, which permits a government to
take private property for public use so long as the government gives its owner
“just compensation.”68
The Court’s first opportunity to reaffirm and apply the Williamson County
test came one year later in the case of MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County.69 In MacDonald, another subdivision developer brought a regulatory
takings claim after the local planning commission rejected the developer’s
proposed map for the subdivision.70 The Court attempted to utilize this
opportunity to explain the “final decision” requirement under Williamson
County.

require, respondent hardly can maintain that the Commission’s disapproval of the
preliminary plat was equivalent to a final decision that no variances would be granted. As
in Hodel, Agins, and Penn Central, then, respondent has not yet obtained a final decision
regarding how it will be allowed to develop its property.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 188-90. “It appears that variances could have been granted to resolve at least five
of the Commission’s eight objections to the plat.” Id. at 188. However, “the record contains no
evidence that respondent ever filed a written request for variances from the cul-de-sac, roadgrade, or frontage requirements of the subdivision regulations.” Id. at 189. “Accordingly, until
the Commission determines that no variances will be granted, it is impossible for the jury to find,
on this record, whether respondent ‘will be unable to derive economic benefit’ from the land.” Id.
at 191 (citations omitted).
66. According to one commentator:
[Williamson County] added the requirement that in addition to the Agins requirement that
a development application be submitted, a plaintiff alleging an as-applied taking must also
seek a variance subsequent to a denial of its application. Without a variance request,
courts and juries are unable to determine the extent of the regulatory restriction and thus
determine whether the restriction affects a taking of property without just compensation.
Whitman, supra note 19, at 31.
67. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194.
68. Id. at 195. While this second requirement has very important ramifications, this Note
focuses on the first component of ripeness under Williamson County. See discussion supra note 8
and infra note 118.
69. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
70. Id. at 342-43. Reasons the commission rejected the plan include that it did not provide
for sufficient access to the subdivision by a public street; it did not provide for adequate sewer
and water service; and the local Sheriff’s Department could not provide sufficient protection for
the area. Id.
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According to the Court an “essential prerequisite to [asserting a regulatory
takings claim] is a final and authoritative determination of the type and
intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property.”71
However, as the Court recognized, regulatory agencies possess great
discretion;72 therefore, obtaining this determination is often difficult. The
Court held that the landowner in MacDonald had not obtained such a
determination despite the fact that it had submitted a proposal and received the
As the Court explained, “rejection of
regulatory agency’s denial.73
exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less
ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews.”74 Therefore,
landowners must submit additional applications seeking less intensive
development before a claim will be ripe. The Court did not specify how many
applications must be filed before a claim is ripe, but it did recognize a “futility
exception” to its finality ripeness requirements. Specifically, the Court stated
that “[a] property owner is of course not required to resort to piecemeal
litigation or otherwise unfair procedures in order to obtain [a final and
authoritative] determination.”75 However, the Court provided no guidance as
to when multiple applications will become “unfair.” Therefore, rather than
clarifying finality ripeness requirements, MacDonald actually added greater
confusion.
The Court’s reapplication requirement had detractors from the beginning.
In his dissent from the Court’s opinion in MacDonald, Justice White argued
against importing this requirement into the Court’s “final decision” analysis.76
While he agreed that the “final decision” requirement was necessary to ensure
that a regulatory agency had arrived at a definitive position, he did not believe
that repeated applications and denials were necessary to establish that
position.77 Justice White argued that there were situations where “[a]
decisionmaker’s definitive position may sometimes be determined by factors
other than its actual decision on the issue in question,” such as where an
71. Id. at 348. As the Court explained, this requirement is due to the nature of a regulatory
takings claims in that “a court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone ‘too far’ unless it
knows how far the regulation goes.” Id.
72. Id. at 350 (stating that “local agencies charged with administering regulations governing
property development are singularly flexible institutions; what they take with the one hand they
may give back with the other”).
73. Id. at 351.
74. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9.
75. Id. at 350 n.7.
76. Id. at 359 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 353.
77. Id. at 359. Justice White argued that, “[n]othing in our cases, however, suggests that the
decisionmaker’s definitive position may be determined only from explicit denials of propertyowner applications for development. Nor do these cases suggest that repeated applications and
denials are necessary to pinpoint that position.” Id.
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agency’s denial explained that the agency interpreted its regulations to bar all
development.78
2.

Recent Decisions: Slowing the Merry-Go-Round

Justice White’s concern about the Court’s reapplication requirement
proved to be prophetic. In theory, the Court’s finality ripeness requirements
respected the autonomy and discretion of regulatory agencies. In practice,
however, these requirements endowed regulatory agencies with too much
power, which threatened the legitimate rights of landowners.79 By itself, this
should have caused concern for the Court; it took on particular significance,
though, as the Court became more conservative in the years following
MacDonald.80 Given the conservative Court’s general sensitivity to threats to
the rights of landowners,81 it is not surprising that the Court began to retreat
from the strict requirements of its finality ripeness doctrine after MacDonald.
Rather than encouraging negotiation, the Court’s recent decisions have sought
to protect landowners’ rights by opening the courthouse door and allowing
them to adjudicate their regulatory takings claims.
The 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council82 was the first
decision to reflect the changing shade of the Court’s regulatory takings
ripeness doctrine. In Lucas, the owner of beachfront property brought a
regulatory takings claim after legislation was passed that “flatly prohibited”
construction of habitable improvements on land seaward of a specified
baseline, which included the landowner’s property.83 In contrast to Agins, the
78. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 359. Justice White stated:
[I]f a landowner applies to develop its land in a relatively intensive manner that is
consistent with the applicable zoning requirements and if the governmental body denies
that application, explaining that all development would be barred under its interpretation
of the zoning ordinance, I would find that a final decision barring all development had
been made, even though the landowner did not apply for less intensive developments.
Id.
79. See infra Part III.B.
80. The complexion of the Court changed considerably between its decision in MacDonald
and its next ripeness decision. Two Republican presidents appointed a total of four justices
during this time. President Ronald Reagan appointed Justice Antonin Scalia in 1986, and he
appointed Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in 1988. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW B-6 (14th ed. 2001). President George Bush appointed Justice
David Souter in 1990, and he appointed Justice Clarence Thomas in 1992. Id.
81. The Court has decided a number of takings claims in favor of landowners. See, e.g.,
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-38 (1987) (holding that unless a permit
restriction serves the same legitimate police power purpose as a development ban, such restriction
constitutes a taking); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 319 (1987) (holding that temporary deprivations are compensable under the Takings
Clause to the same extent as permanent deprivations).
82. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
83. Id. at 1008-09.
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Court held the claim was ripe even though the landowner never submitted any
plan to develop his property.84 According to the Court, “such a submission
would have been pointless” since the regulatory agency had stipulated that no
building permit would have been issued under the challenged legislation
regardless of whether there had been an application.85 With this statement, the
Court added a “pointlessness” modification to the futility exception, allowing
the exception to be invoked even where a landowner has filed no application.86
This pointlessness modification limited the Agins requirement that a regulatory
takings claim could be ripe only after a landowner had actually applied to
develop his or her property.
Five years later, the Court’s decision of Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency87 further opened the courthouse door to landowners. In
Suitum, a regulatory agency denied a landowner permission to build on her
property because it determined that her property was within an
environmentally protected zone.88 Under the challenged legislation, the
landowner was entitled to Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) as a result
of this classification.89 Despite making no attempt to sell these TDRs, the
Court held that the landowner had received a “final decision” as required by
Williamson County.90
According to the Court, Williamson County’s final decision requirement
“applies to decisions about how a takings plaintiff’s own land may be used,
and it responds to the high degree of discretion characteristically possessed by

84. Id. at 1012-13. The Court stated:
In these circumstances, we think it would not accord with sound process to insist that
Lucas pursue the late-created “special permit” procedure before his takings claim can be
considered ripe. Lucas has properly alleged Article III injury in fact in this case, with
respect to both the pre-1990 and post-1990 constraints placed on the use of his parcels by
the Beachfront Management Act. That there is a discretionary “special permit” procedure
by which he may regain—for the future, at least—beneficial use of his land goes only to
the prudential “ripeness” of Lucas’s challenge, and for the reasons discussed we do not
think it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here.
Id.
85. Id. at 1014 n.3.
86. See R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases from Hamilton
Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 101, 124-27 (1993). While the futility exception had
previously been available only after “at least one” meaningful application had been submitted, the
pointlessness modification allowed the futility exception to be invoked even where no application
had been submitted. Id. at 125.
87. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
88. Id. at 731.
89. TDRs were designed to ease the sharpness of the land use restrictions in place. Id. at
730. Owners who were denied permission to build on their lands were granted these TDRs to sell
to owners of land eligible for development. Id. For a full discussion of the role and function of
TDRs, see id. at 730.
90. See id. at 744.
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land use boards in softening the strictures of the general regulations they
administer.”91 However, under the challenged legislation, the regulatory
agency could not permit any additional land coverage or other permanent land
disturbances on land that was in an environmentally protected zone.92
Therefore, once the regulatory agency had determined that the landowner’s
property was in such a zone, its discretion was exhausted, and, as a result, the
Court held that the landowner’s regulatory takings claim was ripe.93
The Court’s decision in Suitum limited the finality ripeness requirements
by establishing that where a regulatory agency possesses no further discretion,
landowners need not submit multiple applications to ripen their takings claims.
However, Suitum did not provide any guidance or place any limits on the
reapplication requirement where a regulatory agency retains discretion to
exercise in the application of its regulations; consequently, it failed to
completely stop the procedural merry-go-round of reapplication. While it was
clearly a victory for landowners, Suitum left some commentators
disappointed,94 and, more importantly, it left landowners still facing the
possibility of submitting an unspecified number of applications to ripen their
regulatory takings claims.
III. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE COURT’S TAKINGS RIPENESS DOCTRINE
A.

Status of the Takings Ripeness Doctrine Prior to Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island

As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, the Court’s regulatory
takings ripeness doctrine evolved in a piecemeal fashion. To understand the
problems that the Court’s takings ripeness doctrine caused, the individual
requirements of the Court’s previous takings ripeness decisions are collected
and explained below. As the centerpiece of the regulatory takings ripeness
91. Id. at 738. The Court further explained:
When such flexibility or discretion may be brought to bear on the permissible use of
property as singular as a parcel of land, a sound judgment about what use will be allowed
simply cannot be made by asking whether a parcel’s characteristics or a proposal’s details
facially conform to the terms of the general use regulations.
Id. at 738-39.
92. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 739.
93. Id. at 739. Specifically, the Court stated that “[b]ecause the agency has no discretion to
exercise over Suitum’s right to use her land, no occasion exists for applying Williamson County’s
requirement that a landowner take steps to obtain a final decision about the use that will be
permitted on a particular parcel.” Id.
94. See, e.g., Haffner, supra note 19, at 141 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Suitum was
a “weak attempt at guidance” and that the test for obtaining a final decision remained
“analytically cryptic”); see also Cross, supra note 22, at 476 (arguing that the Court’s analysis
was proper, but that it “failed to seize an opportunity to clear up confusion regarding ripeness in
land use cases”).
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doctrine, Williamson County established that a landowner must both obtain a
final decision regarding the application of the challenged regulations to his
property and utilize any available state procedures for obtaining just
compensation.95 However, since this Note focuses on finality ripeness, only
the requirements under the first part of the Williamson County test are
considered herein.
1.

Final Decision Distinguished from Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies

As the Court carefully distinguished in Williamson County, finality
ripeness doctrine requires that a landowner obtain a final decision, not exhaust
administrative remedies:
The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is
conceptually distinct . . . from the question whether an administrative action
must be final before it is judicially reviewable. While the policies underlying
the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with
whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the
issue that inflicts an actual concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement
generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured
party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the
decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.96

One commentator draws the distinction between the two by labeling the
exhaustion requirement as “vertical finality” and the finality requirement as
“lateral finality.”97 Under this rubric, a landowner is not obligated to “climb
the administrative ladder” of vertical finality in search of review of the initial
decisionmaker’s ruling; however, the final decision requirement does require
that a landowner seek confirmation from the initial decisionmaker that its
denial of his application is, in fact, final.98
95. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
96. Id. at 192 (citations omitted).
97. See Michael M. Berger, The “Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How the
Supreme Court Converted Judges into Fruit Peddlers, in INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND
EMINENT DOMAIN, 7-15 (Matthew Bender ed., 1991).
98. Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness And Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings
Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 47-48 (1995). Even with this useful distinction, the
concepts often become confusingly intertwined when applied. In Williamson County, the Court
held that the developer would not be required to appeal the planning commission’s rejection of its
plat to the board of adjustment because the board of adjustment had only the power to review, and
did not participate in the approval decision. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193. However, the
Court also indicated that the developer must approach both the board of adjustment and the
planning commission to apply for variances because both of those bodies had power to grant such
variances. Id. at 188-90. Therefore, “[t]he specific context of local procedures coupled with the
purpose of local land use rules drive the course of action a property owner must take” in order to
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The “Meaningful Application” Requirement

The Court established in Agins and San Diego Gas that a landowner must
actually submit an application for development before there can be a final
decision from the regulatory agency charged with administering a challenged
regulation.99 This seemingly straightforward requirement was complicated by
MacDonald, which held that a landowner’s application must be
“meaningful.”100 The only guidance the Court has provided as to what
constitutes a “meaningful application” is that the application cannot be
“exceedingly grandiose.”101 The specific examples of what the Court
considers to be “exceedingly grandiose” are not helpful to most landowners.102
However, to ensure that one has, in fact, submitted a meaningful application,
the Court has established that finality ripeness requires a landowner to pursue
either variances or submit additional applications.

ripen his or her claim. Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness And Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment
Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 48 (1995).
99. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
100. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 352 n.8 (1986). In
MacDonald, the Court explained:
[T]he Court of Appeal relied on the decisions in Agins to illustrate that the property
owners there—as here—had not attempted to obtain approval to develop the land in
accordance with applicable zoning regulations and for this reason had failed to allege
facts which would establish an unconstitutional taking of private property. The
implication is not that future applications would be futile, but that a meaningful
application had not yet been made.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause:
A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating
Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 107 (1994) (noting that “the existence of a
final decision cannot be determined without a meaningful application”).
101. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9; see also James Rosen, Private Property and the
Endangered Species Act: Has the Doctrine of Ripeness Stymied Legitimate Takings Claims?, 6
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 31, 41 (1999) (stating that “[c]urrently, the only
guidance that lower courts have is that an application must be ‘meaningful’ and cannot be
‘exceedingly grandiose’”); see also Overstreet, supra note 100, at 107 (noting that “MacDonald
held that a meaningful application cannot include a request for ‘exceedingly grandiose’
development”).
102. See Roberts supra note 98, at 50-51. Professor Roberts stated:
The Supreme Court has given some examples of grandiose and meaningful applications,
though these examples are not especially helpful. The proposal rejected by the county in
MacDonald was referred to as an “intense type of residential development.” The
MacDonald Court also intimated that the “five Victorian mansions” sought in Agins v.
City of Tiburon and the nuclear power plant in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of
San Diego were of the grandiose variety. The proposed fifty-five office tower atop the
landmark Grand Central Station in the Penn Central case was also likely “grandiose.”
Id.
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As required under both Hodel and Williamson County, landowners must
apply for a variance where such an option exists.103 Even where a regulation
requires an agency to deny a landowner’s application, the regulation “takes”
nothing from the landowner if it also empowers the agency to grant a variance
that allows the landowner to develop as desired.104 Since a variance helps
define the extent of a regulation’s restrictions, it must be pursued before a
landowner can ripen a regulatory takings claim.105
Likewise, as MacDonald established, a landowner must submit additional
permit applications for alternate, scaled-down projects that a regulatory agency
might find acceptable.106 Requiring additional applications recognizes the fact
that land development is often a process of negotiation between a regulatory
agency and a landowner.107 Circumstances dictate when and how often
reapplication must be made, which unfortunately requires guesswork on the
part of the landowner to determine whether additional applications are
necessary.108 In MacDonald, the Court spoke disapprovingly only of
Therefore, one
“relatively intense”109 and “grandiose” proposals.”110
commentator has argued that MacDonald should be read to require repeated
submissions only where the initial request is grandiose.111 However, as
103. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
104. Seeking a variance is not a step in exhausting administrative remedies. Rather, it
establishes the extent of development that the decision-maker will permit under the applicable
regulation. Thus, it is a component of lateral finality, not vertical finality.
105. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting
that regulatory agencies possess great discretion).
106. See Duane J. Desiderio, Growing Too Smart -Takings Implications of Smart Growth
Policies, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 330, 331 (1998); see also 58 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts
§ 137 (2000) (noting that “[t]he submission and denial of a single application may not be
sufficient to satisfy the finality requirement of ripeness”).
107. In MacDonald, the Court noted that “[l]and use planning is not an all-or-nothing
proposition.” 477 U.S. at 347. The Court also stated, “local agencies charged with administering
regulations governing property development are singularly flexible institutions; what they take
with the one hand they may give back with the other.” Id. at 350.
108. See Roberts, supra note 98, at 51. Landowners must consider whether a regulatory
agency might also reject a more modest proposal. Id. at 50. This requires landowners to predict
what regulatory agencies will allow in their discretion. Furthermore, there is an inherent tension
within this reapplication requirement. As Professor Roberts explained:
On one level, a developer may be required to submit a request or requests and make some
concessions. However, reading the meaningful application rule to make a local
government’s decision unreviewable because a developer is unwilling to significantly
reduce a project to meet what that developer considers unreasonable demands is an overly
broad application of the rule.
Id. at 52.
109. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 347.
110. Id. at 353.
111. See Roberts, supra note 98, at 52 (noting that MacDonald “need not be read as requiring
repeated submissions”).
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discussed above, the Court has provided little practical guidance as to what is
“grandiose.”112 The Court’s decision in Suitum limited the reapplication
requirement, but it removed the obligation of reapplication only in situations
where regulatory agencies no longer possess any discretion to exercise in
determining the extent of permissible development.113 Consequently, where
regulatory agencies have discretion, landowners are still confronted with the
possibility of submitting an unknown number of applications, each asking for
less intensive development, before ripening a regulatory takings claim.
3.

Futility

The Court’s decision in MacDonald also recognized the existence of a
futility exception to the “final decision” requirement.114 There are two
separate ways in which a landowner can successfully invoke the futility
exception. First, if a landowner has submitted at least one application, he can
invoke the futility exception by showing that there is strong evidence that
variance applications or scaled-down reapplications would not succeed.115
Second, under the pointlessness modification established by Lucas, a
landowner may successfully invoke the futility exception even without filing
an initial application by proving that doing so would be “pointless.”116 The
112. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
113. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997) (noting that there
was no occasion to fulfill the “final decision” requirement because the regulatory agency had no
further discretion to exercise).
114. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. While MacDonald provided support for such
a futility exception, it did not offer much guidance as to the contours of such exception.
115. See Lyman, supra note 86, at 124. Courts have inferred futility where:
[T]he agency has no power to grant relief; the agency lacks the power to grant relief
which would permit the proposed project to be developed; the community is openly
hostile to the property owner’s proposal; the regulatory agency is openly hostile either
toward the property owner, his proposal, or the type of development proposed; or the
regulation was adopted to preclude the type of development the owner wishes to make.
Michael M. Berger, “Ripeness” Test for Land Use Cases Needs Reform: Reconciling Leading
Ninth Circuit Decisions is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57, 60 (1988).
However, successfully invoking the futility exception under the above situations is often
difficult. See Roberts, supra note 98, at 53 (stating that “[s]uspicions as to local hostility or even
oral statements by local officials generally cannot be relied upon to release the property owner
from the obligation of making a formal application”).
116. See Lyman, supra note 86, at 125. Lyman argued that this pointlessness modification is
detrimental to the goals of ripeness.
The pointlessness modification undermines the instrumental benefits of the previous
finality ripeness requirements by leaving courts with precious little guidance when they
review future allegations of futility or pointlessness. Under the previously existing
standard, their judgment could be informed by at least one identifiable interaction
between the developer and the regulatory body. The record created by that interplay,
while likely to be scanty, particularly in the context of locally controlled zoning, would
nevertheless provide some indication of the posture struck by the regulators. In contrast,
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applicability of the futility exception depends upon whether the relief sought is
theoretically possible, not the likelihood of success.117 Therefore, where relief
is theoretically possible, landowners remain confronted with the vexatious
problem of determining whether and how many times to reapply.
B.

Threats Facing Landowners’ Rights

The Court’s regulatory takings ripeness doctrine threatens the rights of
landowners.118 With respect to finality ripeness, landowners encounter
difficulty ascertaining the number of applications needed to ripen a claim as
well as when submitting further applications will be considered futile.119

courts henceforth will often be forced to speculate on the basis of a bald assertion and an
abbreviated response.
Id.
117. See Roberts, supra note 98, at 53. Professor Roberts also stated that “[w]hile the
absence of a variance or other similar procedure may render the claim ripe as to prong one on
futility grounds, such an absence, standing alone, is not proof of futility. Even where no variance
procedure exists, instances arise where a rezoning must be sought.” Id. at 54.
118. While this Note focuses on the problems with the finality ripeness requirements, the
second part of the Williamson County test, exhaustion of state compensation procedures, has also
created problems. These problems deal with preclusion and landowners’ inability to bring a
claim in federal court after pursing all available remedies on the state level, which often includes
bringing an action in state court. Two commentators have described the problem succinctly.
Put simply, the preclusion doctrines prevent re-litigation of claims and issues in a
subsequent court that were already decided in an earlier forum. Assuming that property
owners must ripen their takings cases by litigating in state court first, federal courts are
refusing to hear takings claims that were already litigated before state tribunals. Thus, the
synergy between the preclusion doctrines and current ripeness rules is that owners are
forced to litigate their constitutional takings claims in state court, without ever receiving a
federal adjudication on the merits.
John J. Delaney and Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”? A Call for
Reform so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 200-01
(1999). For further discussion of this problem, see generally Thomas E. Roberts, Procedural
Implications of Williamson County/First English in Regulatory Takings Litigation: Reservations,
Removal Diversity, Supplemental Jurisdication, Rooker-Feldman, and Res Judicata, 31 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10353 (2001); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in
Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2000); supra note 42 and accompanying text;
and Douglas T. Kendall, Choice of Forum and Finality Ripeness: The Unappreciated Hot Topics
in Regulatory Takings Cases, 33 URB. LAW. 405, 407-21 (2001) (discussing the intersection of
the second Williamson County ripeness requirement with issue and claim preclusion).
119. See Roberts, supra note 98, at 37-39. Professor Roberts stated:
Despite [the requirements enunciated by the Court in its decisions] the case reporters over
the past decade are filled with suits that have been filed prematurely in both state and
federal court without a final decision from the local authorities . . . . Some of these
premature litigation efforts are understandable in light of uncertainty regarding the finality
of a decision for the purposes of prong one and the difficulty in distinguishing finality
from exhaustion.
Id.
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Under MacDonald, landowners must engage in an indefinite and circular
process that includes application, reapplication, followed by application for
variances. One commentator likens a landowner’s search for finality ripeness
to “chasing a feather in the wind.”120 Due to this elusive nature, “the ripeness
requirements in the land use context have created an almost impenetrable wall
between landowners and the judicial system.”121 Landowners who fail to
attain finality ripeness are “left at the courthouse steps after spending
extraordinary amounts of [time and] money to even knock on the courthouse
door.”122 Many landowners are familiar with this result; in fact, the great
majority of landowners’ regulatory takings claims have been dismissed on
Furthermore, even where landowners have been
ripeness grounds.123
successful in their attempts to have their claims heard on their merits, they
have first had to pass through years of costly litigation and negotiation due to
the Court’s ripeness requirements.124
These problems facing landowners were highlighted in the case of Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey.125 In Del Monte Dunes, a
regulatory agency denied a landowner permission to develop property even
after the landowner submitted four separate applications, three of which sought
the exact level of development that the agency had previously indicated would
be acceptable.126 Upon denial of its final proposal, the landowner filed an
administrative appeal with the city council, which found the plan “conceptually
satisfactory” and granted a conditional use permit to commence
development.127 However, even after the landowner met the conditions
imposed for development, the regulatory agency again denied the proposed
development.128 After another administrative appeal was denied,129 the

120. See Maraist, supra note 17, at 417.
121. Id. at 415.
122. Id. at 448.
123. According to a survey of reported federal takings cases through the end of 1998, 83% of
regulatory takings cases with an opinion reported by a U.S. district court were dismissed on
ripeness or abstention grounds, and of those landowners that could afford to bring an appeal, 64%
of them still faced dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. See Delaney & Desiderio, supra note 118,
at 196.
124. For those few landowners that received a determination that their takings claims could be
adjudicated on the merits, not an actual adjudication upon those merits, had to endure an average
of 9.6 years of negotiation and litigation. Id.
125. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990).
126. Id. at 1502.
127. Id. at 1502-03.
128. Id. at 1504.
129. Id.
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landowner filed a regulatory takings claim.130 Remarkably, a federal district
court held the landowner’s regulatory takings claim to be unripe.131
By barring landowners’ regulatory takings claims from court, even those
with near-farcical procedural backgrounds such as Del Monte Dunes, finality
ripeness requirements have endangered landowners’ property rights in two
ways. Most obviously, these ripeness requirements have denied landowners
the protection afforded by formal adjudication of their regulatory takings
claims. In addition, finality ripeness threatens landowners’ rights through the
very process of negotiation it seeks to further.132 Regulatory agencies have
little incentive to negotiate seriously with landowners. Agencies know that
ripeness requirements make it difficult, if not nearly impossible, for
landowners to bring regulatory takings claims in court.133 Therefore, rather
than making concessions to landowners, regulatory agencies can simply
require landowners to submit more applications, each asking for less intensive
development. Without the ability to make a credible threat to bring a claim in
court, landowners are stripped of perhaps their most important bargaining chip.
Not surprisingly, ripeness doctrine has been referred to as “the landowner’s
nemesis and the municipality’s best friend.”134
During its 1997-1998 term, the United States Congress considered
legislation that would have addressed the problems created by finality ripeness
requirements.135 This legislation addressed finality ripeness in two manners.
First, it “uniformly call[ed] for submission of one development application to a
zoning body, and pursuit of one available waiver and/or appeal therefrom.”136
130. Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1500.
131. Id. The Court of Appeals subsequently found the claim ripe. Id. at 1509. However, Del
Monte Dunes demonstrated the possibility for inequitable results under the Court’s finality
ripeness requirement.
132. This second danger to landowners’ rights occurs within the process of what Professor
Marc Galanter refers to as “litigotiation.” See generally Marc S. Galanter, Worlds of Deals:
Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984). In
Professor Galanter’s view, settlement and adjudication should be thought of as “aspects of a
single process of strategic maneuver and bargaining in the (actual or threatened) presence of
courts.” Marc. S. Galanter, Federal Rules and the Quality of Settlements: A Comment on
Rosenberg’s, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2231, 2232-33
(1989). “The courts are central to the litigotiation game because of the ‘bargaining endowments’
they bestow on the parties . . . . Bargaining chips derive from the substantive entitlements
conferred by legal rules and from the procedural rules that enable these entitlements to be
vindicated. “ See Galanter, supra, at 268-69.
133. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
134. See Whitman, supra note 19, at 14.
135. See The Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997, H.R. 1534, 105th Cong.
(1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Jan. 21, 2002); The Private Property Rights
Implementation Act of 1998, S. 2271, 105th Cong. (1998), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last
visited Jan. 21, 2002).
136. See Delaney & Desiderio, supra note 118, at 248.
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This would have greatly clarified the “meaningful application” requirement
and eliminated the guesswork involved in reapplication. Second, this
legislation would have codified the futility exception by “provid[ing] that a
property owner need not make one application, or pursue a waiver/appeal
therefrom, where the prospects for success are reasonably unlikely and
intervention by the district court is warranted to decide the merits.”137 This
legislation received considerable bipartisan support, but it fell just short of
obtaining the number of votes necessary to overcome an anticipated
filibuster.138 However, the opposition’s main point of contention dealt with the
legislation’s effect on the second part of the Williamson County test.139 There
appeared to be little disagreement over the positive effects this proposed
reform would have had on the finality ripeness requirements.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION IN PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND
Threats to landowners’ property rights stemming from the finality ripeness
requirements have persisted despite both the Court’s recent landowner-friendly
decisions and the attempted legislative reform. The Court’s most recent
opportunity to address this problem came in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.140
While not fundamentally changing the regulatory takings ripeness doctrine,
Palazzolo continues the Court’s trend of holding claims to be ripe. Palazzolo
offers protection for landowners’ rights by indicating that courts should hold
regulatory takings claims to be ripe under a wide range of circumstances. Due
to vagueness in some parts of the opinion, however, the Court’s decision may
137. Id. at 249.
138. H.R. 1534 had 239 co-sponsors and passed the House of Representatives by a vote of
248-178. However, its companion bill S. 2271 fell 8 votes shy of the 60 votes needed to
overcome an anticipated filibuster. Id. at 195.
139. See id. at 197. Delaney & Desiderio stated:
A vehement opposition ultimately defeated S. 2271 in the Senate. The main contention of
the Bill’s detractors focused on the current ripeness requirement that a property owner
must first exhaust state compensation remedies prior to receiving a federal hearing on the
merits of a takings. This translates into a requirement that property owners must “go two
rounds” by first paying for litigation in the state court, before federal court litigation can
be pursued to vindicate federally protected property rights. The Bills, however, would
have dispensed with mandating initial state court litigation as a ripening element to a
federal claim. The Bills would have allowed property owners who only assert federal
claims access to the federal courts once they received a final decision from land-use
officials on the permissible uses of the property at issue. Nonetheless, the Bill’s
detractor’s insisted that, if federal judges were permitted to hear the merits of federal
takings cases without initial state court litigation, then somehow the traditional province
of localities to regulate land use would be usurped.
Id. For one commentator’s rebuttal of the criticisms directed towards this legislation, see John J.
Delaney, The Ripeness Hurdle for Takings Claims—H.R. 1534: Leveling the Playing Field for
Citizens with Takings Claims in Federal Courts, 14 A.L.I. 473, 478-81 (1998).
140. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
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ultimately leave both landowners and regulatory agencies dissatisfied with the
status of the regulatory takings ripeness doctrine.
In 1959, Anthony Palazzolo and several other individuals formed Shore
Gardens, Inc. (SGI), which purchased three underdeveloped adjoining parcels
of land along the coastline of Westerly, Rhode Island.141 Mr. Palazzolo
subsequently purchased the interests of his associates and became the sole
shareholder of SGI.142 Between 1962 and 1971, SGI made three attempts to
develop the property, none of which was successful.143 Before the next
application was made, two significant intervening events occurred. In 1971
Rhode Island created the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Council, which passed regulations designating certain areas as “protected
coastal wetlands.”144 Seven years later, title of the disputed parcel passed to
Mr. Palazzolo in his individual capacity.145
In 1983, Mr. Palazzolo again sought to develop his property. He submitted
an application to the Council that requested permission to fill the entire
wetlands land area of his property for development purposes. The Council,
however, rejected this application, in part because it conflicted with the Coastal
Resources Management Plan that was in effect.146 In 1985, Mr. Palazzolo
submitted another application. This proposal sought to construct a private
beach club that required filling only eleven of Mr. Palazzolo’s eighteen
wetland acres.147 The Council rejected this application as well because it
concluded this proposed activity did not serve a “compelling public purpose,”
as was required to secure a special exception under its regulations.148 Mr.
141. Id. at 2455.
142. Id.
143. Id. The first application, made in 1962, sought to fill the entire property. This
application, however, was denied by the Rhode Island Division of Harbors and Rivers due to
“lack of essential information.” Id. The second application was submitted one year later, and in
1966, while the second application was still pending, SGI submitted a third proposal that sought
“more limited filling for use as a private beach club.” Id. The Rhode Island Department of
Natural Resources initially indicated its approval of the second and third applications, but it later
withdrew this approval due to “adverse environmental impacts.” Id. at 2455-56.
144. Id. at 2456.
145. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456. The reason title passed to Palazzolo was because SGI
failed to pay its taxes and lost its corporate charter. “[T]itle to the property passed, by operation
of state law, to petitioner as the corporation’s sole shareholder.” Id.
146. Id. Other reasons the Council offered for rejecting this application included that it was
vague and inadequate for the size and nature of the proposed project. Id.
147. Id. The Court described the proposed project as a “beach club,” but stated that “[t]he
details do not tend to inspire the reader with an idyllic coastal image, for the proposal was to fill
11 acres of the property with gravel to accommodate 50 cars with boat trailers, a dumpster, porta-johns, picnic tables, barbecue pits of concrete, and other trash receptacles.” Id.
148. Id. Under the Council’s regulations, a landowner who wished to fill his or her land
needed a “special exception,” which was granted only if the proposed activity served a
“compelling public purpose which provides benefits to the public as a whole as opposed to
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Palazzolo appealed this decision to the Rhode Island state courts, which
affirmed the Council’s decision.149
Mr. Palazzolo subsequently brought a regulatory takings claim before the
Rhode Island Superior Court, seeking damages of $3,150,000, which was
based upon an appraiser’s estimate of the value that a 74-lot residential
subdivision would have on the property.150 Upon completion of a bench trial, a
justice of the Rhode Island Superior Court ruled against Mr. Palazzolo.151 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding first that the claim
was not ripe; second, that Mr. Palazzolo could not challenge regulations that
were passed before he succeeded to legal title; and, third, that his claimed
deprivation of all economically beneficial use was contradicted by undisputed
evidence that $200,000 in development value remained on an upland portion of
his property.152 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the Rhode Island Supreme Court on the first two issues, upheld
its decision regarding the third issue and remanded the case for further
consideration.153
A.

The Majority Opinion

Recognizing that “[t]he central question in resolving the ripeness issue . . .
is whether [he] obtained a final decision from the Council determining the
permitted use for [his] land,” the Court held that Mr. Palazzolo had satisfied
the requirements of finality ripeness.154 The Rhode Island Supreme Court had
concluded that Mr. Palazzolo’s claim was not ripe in part due to his failure to
pursue “any other use for the property that would involve filling substantially
less wetlands.”155 Relying on MacDonald, the Rhode Island Supreme Court

individual or private interests.” Id. (citing the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Program § 130A(1)).
149. Id.
150. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2457. In addition to holding that Mr. Palazzolo could not recover under the claim
asserting denial of all economic use, the Rhode Island Supreme Court also concluded he could
not recover under the more flexible Penn Central test. In reaching this conclusion, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court reasoned that Mr. Palazzolo could have “no reasonable investment backed
expectations” that were affected by the challenged regulation because the regulation predated his
ownership. Id.
153. Id. With respect to the ripeness issue, the Court voted 6-3 to reverse the decision of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, as well as Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas and Stevens. Id. at 2454. However, the
decision of the Court was only 5-4 regarding the issue of whether post-enactment acquisition of
title would bar a claim because Justice Stevens did not join. Id.
154. Id. at 2458.
155. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I.
2000)).
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had concluded that the extent of permissible development would not be known
until Mr. Palazzolo filed additional applications requesting less filling on the
wetlands.156 However, the United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that
this reasoning “[was] belied by the unequivocal nature of the wetland
regulations at issue and by the Council’s application of the regulations to the
subject property.”157 The Court argued that there was no indication that the
Council would have accepted Mr. Palazzolo’s proposals if they had occupied a
smaller area. The Court based this conclusion on the fact that the Council
denied Mr. Palazzolo’s proposed activity because it was not a “compelling
public purpose,” not because it was grandiose or requested too much fill.158
Once the Council made this decision, the extent of permissible development on
Mr. Palazzolo’s land and further applications were unnecessary.
As the Court explained, its earlier decisions “stand for the important
principle that a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use
authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide
and explain the reach of a challenged regulation.”159 The Court also held,
however, that “once it becomes clear that [an] agency lacks the discretion to
permit any development, or the permissible uses of the property are known to a
reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened.”160
With respect to Mr. Palazzolo’s claim, the Council’s decisions denied any
filling of Mr. Palazzolo’s wetlands because his proposals were not “compelling
public purpose[s].”161 Since “with no fill there [could] be no structures and no
development on the wetlands,” the extent of permissible development was
known, and Mr. Palazzolo did not need to pursue further applications to ripen
his claim.162

156. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court suggested “that while the Council rejected [Mr.
Palazzolo’s] effort to fill all of the wetlands, and then rejected his proposal to fill 11 acres,
perhaps an application to fill (for instance) 5 acres would have been approved.” Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2459.
159. Id. The Court also stated that “a landowner must give a land-use authority an
opportunity to exercise its discretion.” Id. Furthermore,
[u]nder [the Court’s] ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation which is
alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner’s first having
followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to exercise their full
discretion in considering development plans for the property, including the opportunity to
grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.
Id.
160. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2459.
161. Id. According to the Court, the fact that the Council interpreted its regulations to bar Mr.
Palazzolo from engaging in any filling or development activity on the wetlands was further
reinforced by the briefs, arguments and statements by counsel for both sides. Palazzolo, 121 S.
Ct. at 2459.
162. Id.
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In holding Mr. Palazzolo’s claim to be ripe, the Court also addressed the
fact that he never submitted an application to develop solely the unprotected
uplands portion of his parcel. Such an application likely would have been
approved.163 Rhode Island argued that because Mr. Palazzolo did not pursue
development opportunities on this portion of his land a court could not
determine “how far” the challenged regulation actually went in taking his
property.164 While the Court agreed that the purpose of ripeness doctrine is to
determine “how far” a regulation limits a landowner’s use of his property,165 it
argued there was no uncertainty regarding the value of Mr. Palazzolo’s uplands
parcel.166 According to the Court, Rhode Island had accepted a value of
$200,000 for this parcel in its brief.167 Furthermore, the Court concluded that
this was the extent of permissible development because Rhode Island had an
incentive to establish the highest value possible since it was aware of the
applicability of a Penn Central regulatory takings claim.168 Since the extent of
permissible development was known, the Court held that Mr. Palazzolo did not
need to actually apply to develop the uplands portion of his parcel in order to
ripen his claim.
The final issue the Court faced in holding Mr. Palazzolo’s claim to be ripe
was that he had never applied to develop the subdivision that served as the
basis for the damages he sought.169 The Court recognized that “[t]he mere
163. Id. at 2460. This uplands parcel was not within the zone of protected land and therefore
was not subject to the strict “compelling public purpose” test. Council officials testified at trial
that they would have allowed Mr. Palazzolo to develop this portion of his parcel. Id.
164. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court had noted, “[i]t would be possible to build at least
one single-family home on the upland portion of the parcel.” Id. (emphasis added). In arguing
that Mr. Palazzolo’s claim was unripe, Rhode Island contended use of the qualification “at least”
suggested there was additional development possible. Id.
165. Id.
166. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
167. Id. at 2460. Mr. Palazzolo’s petition for certiorari stated that his uplands had an
estimated $200,000 of worth. The Court noted that Rhode Island not only did not contest this
figure, but it also cited it as a fact in its opposition brief. Id.
168. Id. at 2461. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued Rhode Island may have accepted the
$200,000 value for the upland parcel because only a Lucas claim was raised in the pleadings at
the state trial court. Id. at 2474 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She contended that because a Penn
Central claim was not pursued at trial, Rhode Island had no reason to assert that more than a
single-family residence might be placed on the upland parcel. Id. However, the Court concluded
that Rhode Island was aware of the applicability of Penn Central and that the state court opinions
could not be read as indicating that a Penn Central claim was not properly presented from the
beginning of the litigation. Id. at 2461.
169. Id. This is relevant because the Council considered a proposal only where an applicant
had satisfied “all other regulatory preconditions for the use envisioned in the application.” Id. A
subdivision proposal would have required several forms of approval, and since Mr. Palazzolo did
not pursue them, Rhode Island accused Mr. Palazzolo of employing a “hide the ball strategy of
submitting applications for more modest uses to the Council, only to assert later a takings claim
action predicated on the purported inability to build a much larger project.” Id.
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allegation of entitlement to the value of an intensive use will not avail the
landowner if the project would not have been allowed under other existing,
legitimate land use limitations.”170 However, the Court also explained that its
ripeness decisions did not require Mr. Palazzolo to apply for this subdivision
because the limitations imposed by the Council’s regulations were clearly
known from the denial of his applications.171 To conclude its ripeness
discussion, the Court provided a useful summary:
[W]here the state agency charged with enforcing a challenged land use
regulation entertains an application from an owner and its denial of the
application makes clear the extent of development permitted, and neither the
agency nor a reviewing state court has cited non-compliance with reasonable
state law exhaustion or pre-permit processes, federal ripeness rules do not
require the submission of further and futile applications with other agencies.172

After holding that Mr. Palazzolo’s regulatory takings claim was ripe, the
Court addressed whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court was correct in
concluding that Mr. Palazzolo’s acquisition of title after the enactment of the
challenged regulation prevented him from bringing his regulatory takings
claim. According to the Court, a regulatory takings claim “is not barred by the
mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed
restriction.”173 For support the Court cited its decision in Nollan v. California

170. Id. Furthermore, the Court also indicated that it would not prohibit local governments
from requiring landowners to “follow normal planning procedures,” nor would it prohibit them
from “enact[ing] rules to control damage awards based on hypothetical uses that should have
been reviewed in the normal course.” Id.
171. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2462. The Council had informed Palazzolo that he could not fill
his wetlands, and, therefore, “it follows of necessity” that he could not fill it to build a
subdivision. Id. at 2461.
172. Id. at 2462 (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 2464. The Court noted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s contrary holding
amounted to “a single, sweeping, rule: [a] purchaser or successive title holder . . . is deemed to
have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.”
Id. at 2462. In rather colorful language, the Court stated that “[t]he State may not put so potent a
Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.” Id. at 2462. This issue was discussed extensively
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision of Palazzolo. For discussion of the “notice rule,” see
generally Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings “Notice Rule”: Sources and Implications, 64
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 365 (2001); R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory
Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001) and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and
the Rule of Law: Teaching Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. __ (2002).
This issue will likely generate great interest among commentators; however, this Note will not
address in depth either the majority’s position or the concurrences and dissents regarding this
issue. Rather, this Note highlights the role of ripeness in the Court’s reasoning regarding this
issue.
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Coastal Commission174 as well as ripeness concerns. Under these ripeness
concerns, the Court noted that it might take years to ripen a claim, and
“[s]hould an owner attempt to challenge a new regulation, but not survive the
process of ripening his or her claim . . . under [the Rhode Island Supreme
Court’s] proposed rule the right to compensation may not [be] asserted by an
heir or successor, and so may not be asserted at all.”175 The Court concluded
that where the steps necessary to ripen a claim were not taken, or could not
have been taken by a previous owner, “[i]t would be illogical, and unfair, to
bar a regulatory takings claim because of the post-enactment transfer of
ownership.”176
Despite succeeding on the ripeness and post-enactment acquisition issues,
Mr. Palazzolo’s regulatory takings claim for total deprivation of economically
beneficial use ultimately failed because the Court recognized that $200,000 of
undisputed value remained in the uplands portion of Mr. Palazzolo’s parcel.177
The Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island state court system to
examine Mr. Palazzolo’s claim under a Penn Central analysis, which had not
been addressed at trial.178

174. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, the Court confronted the issue of whether a state
regulatory agency could require oceanfront landowners to provide beach access to the public as a
condition to obtaining a development permit. Id. at 827. The principal dissenting opinion in
Nollan noted that the relevant regulatory agency’s policy was to require the condition. Therefore,
the Nollans, who purchased their home after the policy became effective, were “on notice that
new developments would be approved only if provisions were made for lateral beach access.” Id.
at 860. However, a majority of the Nollan Court rejected this argument, stating that “[s]o long as
the [regulatory commission] could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without
compensating them, the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property
rights in conveying the lot.” Id. at 833 n.2.
175. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463. The rule proposed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
would prejudice newly regulated landowners by stripping them of the ability to transfer any
interests that were possessed prior to a regulation. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2465. Mr. Palazzolo had accepted both the Council’s contention and the Rhode
Island trial court’s finding that his parcel, by way of the uplands portion, retained $200,000 of
development value under the challenged regulations. Id. at 2464. He attempted to avoid an
adverse finding on this issue by arguing that the upland parcel was distinct from the wetlands
portions, and that the asserted deprivation of all beneficial use should be limited to the latter. Id.
However, the Court noted that Palazzolo did not present this argument in either the state courts or
his petition for certiorari and held that since the case came before it on the premise that the entire
parcel served as the basis for his takings claim, the total deprivation argument failed. Id.
178. Id. at 2465. For a discussion of the distinction between a Penn Central regulatory
takings claim and Lucas claims of total deprivation of economically beneficial use, see supra note
38.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

B.

TRYING TO HALT THE PROCEDURAL MERRY-GO-ROUND

865

The Ripeness Dissent

In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s opinion was “both
inaccurate and inequitable.”179 She contended that the Court’s decision was
inaccurate because the record was ambiguous with respect to the extent of
permissible development.180 As a result, Justice Ginsburg believed Mr.
Palazzolo needed to file additional applications to ripen his claim.181 To defeat
Mr. Palazzolo’s claim of total deprivation of economic use, Rhode Island
needed only to establish that some beneficial use remained under the
challenged regulations.182 Therefore, Rhode Island established “only a floor,
not a ceiling” to the value of Mr. Palazzolo’s uplands portion of his parcel
when it proved the Council would have allowed him to build a $200,000 home
on it.183 For related reasons, Justice Ginsburg argued the Court’s decision was
also inequitable. Because Rhode Island had no reason to pursue further inquiry
into potential upland development, Justice Ginsburg stated that Mr. Palazzolo’s
tactic of presenting a new claim before the Court amounted to a “bait-andswitch ploy,” which the Court ought not have entertained.184
V. ANALYSIS OF PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND: THE NEW “SHADE” OF
RIPENESS
While the Court’s decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island does not
fundamentally change the regulatory takings ripeness doctrine, it nevertheless
is a significant decision. Continuing its recent trend, Palazzolo reflects the
179. Id. at 2473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg was joined in her dissent by
Justice Souter and Justice Breyer. Id. at 2472.
180. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that witnesses
acknowledged at trial that Mr. Palazzolo might be able to build on an undetermined number of
lots on the uplands parcel).
181. Id. at 2473. Justice Ginsburg viewed Mr. Palazzolo’s case as a “close analogue” to
MacDonald and cited MacDonald for the proposition that “[r]ejection of exceedingly grandiose
development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly
unfavorable reviews.” Id. (citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Co., 477 U.S. 340, 353
n.9 (1986)).
182. Id. at 2474. Justice Ginsburg stated that Palazzolo “pressed only a Lucas-based claim
that he had been denied all economically viable use of his property.” Id. “Responding to
Palazzolo’s Lucas claim, the State urged as a sufficient defense this now uncontested point:
CRMC ‘would [have been] happy to have [Palazzolo] situate a home ‘on the uplands,’ thus
allowing [him] to realize 200,000 dollars.” Id.
183. Id. at 2476.
184. Id. at 2474. Justice Ginsburg argued that in holding Palazzolo’s claim ripe, the Court
“transform[ed] the State’s legitimate defense to the only claim Palazzolo stated below into
offensive support for other claims he state[d] for the first time [before the Supreme Court].” Id. at
2476. Furthermore, she argued that the “Court’s waiver ruling thus amount[ed] to an unsavory
invitation to unscrupulous litigants: Change your theory and misrepresent the record in their
petition for certiorari; if the respondent fails to note your machinations, you have created a
different record on which this Court will review the case.” Id.
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Court’s growing inclination to hold regulatory takings claims to be ripe, thus
modifying the “shade” of the takings ripeness doctrine. In keeping with the
Court’s clarification of its takings ripeness doctrine, lower courts should find
claims to be ripe under a wider range of circumstances. By opening the
courthouse door to landowners and their regulatory takings claims, Palazzolo
offers increased protection for landowners’ rights. However, the Court’s
decision in Palazzolo contains vagueness that may ultimately leave both
landowners and regulatory agencies dissatisfied with the status of the takings
ripeness doctrine.
Upon initial review, it may be difficult to ascertain what Palazzolo
contributes to the regulatory takings ripeness doctrine. Indeed, some
commentators have suggested that the Court’s decision in Palazzolo adds little,
if anything, to the Court’s existing ripeness doctrine.185 This conclusion is
understandable, especially since Palazzolo can be seen as a close analogue to
the Court’s earlier decision of Suitum. In Suitum the Court indicated that
where an agency has no further discretion to exercise over a landowner’s right
to use his property, the finality ripeness doctrine does not require the
landowner to pursue variances or submit additional applications.186 According
to the Court in Palazzolo, “the Council’s decisions make plain that the agency
interpreted its regulations to bar [Mr. Palazzolo] from engaging in any . . .
development activity on the wetlands.”187 Once the Council interpreted its
regulations to prohibit any development, it necessarily had no further
discretion to exercise. The Court, therefore, could have held Mr. Palazzolo’s
claim to be ripe without expanding beyond its earlier decision in Suitum.
While this analysis is ultimately correct, such a narrow view of the Court’s
decision does not recognize the importance of the Court’s growing inclination
to hold regulatory takings claims to be ripe.
On several levels, Palazzolo reflects the Court’s inclination to hold a
takings claim to be ripe. Superficially, this inclination is most apparent in Mr.
Palazzolo’s avoidance of the procedural problems that have plagued many
landowners who previously attempted to bring regulatory takings claims.188
185. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 11112, 11115 (2001) (stating that “the outcome [in Palazzolo] appears to have
turned on the particular facts of the case and the Court has not broken any new ground in terms of
basic doctrine”); Steven J. Eagle, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: A Few Clear Answers and Many
New Questions, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10127, 10131 (2002) (noting that “[i]t is unclear whether
Palazzolo will have an appreciable effect upon the Court’s regulatory takings ripeness
jurisprudence”).
186. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
187. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2459.
188. Perhaps the most obvious, yet least trustworthy, reflection of the Court’s inclination to
hold a regulatory takings claim to be ripe is the fact that the Court held Mr. Palazzolo’s claim to
be so. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464. By itself, this stands in contrast to the Court’s early takings
ripeness decisions. See supra Part II.C.1.
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This is made even more noteworthy by Mr. Palazzolo’s successful evasion of
the procedural merry-go-round of reapplication. Mr. Palazzolo submitted a
total of only two applications to develop his property, and while the second
application requested less intensive development, it still ambitiously sought to
fill more than half of his wetlands property.189 After this brief and relatively
modest attempt to accommodate, the Court held Mr. Palazzolo’s takings claim
to be ripe. In this respect, Palazzolo stands in stark contrast to Del Monte
Dunes, where the landowner followed an exhaustive and frustrating process of
application, denial, re-application and denial again only to have a district court
hold its regulatory takings claim to be unripe.190 Such a dramatic contrast
provides at least a superficial indication that the Court is leaning toward
holding regulatory takings claims to be ripe at a lower threshold.
The Court’s inclination is even more meaningfully reflected by the extent
of the Court’s shift away from encouraging negotiation. As Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent illustrated, Rhode Island presented a compelling argument that the
value of Mr. Palazzolo’s uplands parcel remained uncertain.191 Had the Court
sought to encourage negotiation between Mr. Palazzolo and the Council, it
could have easily utilized its ripeness doctrine to require additional
applications, which would have provided more time and opportunity for
compromise and settlement outside of the court system. Instead, the Court
went to great lengths to enable Mr. Palazzolo to litigate his takings claim
without further delay. Even though the Council never made a decision
regarding what development it would allow on Mr. Palazzolo’s uplands parcel,
the Court argued that the value was certain since Rhode Island had “stipulated”
to it in its opposition brief.192 In order to sidestep further ambiguity,193 the
Court postulated that this was the maximum value of the parcel because Rhode
Island was merely aware of the applicability of a claim Mr. Palazzolo did not
raise at the trial level.194 Leaving aside questions of whether the Court’s
189. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458. Mr. Palazzolo’s second application sought to fill eleven
of his eighteen wetland acres. Id.
190. For a description of the landowner’s difficulties in Del Monte Dunes, see supra notes
125-31 and accompanying text.
191. Rhode Island argued that the value of the uplands parcel remained in doubt because the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had merely stated that “it would be possible to build at least one
single-family home on the upland portion of the parcel.” Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2460 (emphasis
added); see also supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
192. See discussion at supra note 164 and accompanying text.
193. Possible ambiguity still remained because Mr. Palazzolo had brought only a claim of
total deprivation of economic use. Any value, not only the highest value, remaining in the
uplands parcel would be sufficient to defeat this claim. See discussion at supra note 168 and
accompanying text.
194. See id. The Court’s argument could be characterized cynically as requiring Rhode Island
to anticipate every claim Mr. Palazzolo might have brought and argue against each one,
regardless of whether he ever actually brought them.
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decision was ultimately correct, the Court could have reasonably held Mr.
Palazzolo’s claim to be unripe at any one of several steps if it had sought to
encourage negotiation. The Court’s decision not to do so indicates that it had a
greater interest in protecting Mr. Palazzolo’s property rights through litigation.
In Palazzolo, the Court attempted to ensure that the rights of landowners
are protected when they first bring regulatory takings claims. The Court’s
clarification of the finality ripeness requirements indicates to lower courts that
they should hold claims to be ripe under a wider set of circumstances. As the
Court had previously explained, the ripeness doctrine exists to ensure that the
extent of a challenged regulation is known.195 In Palazzolo the Court stated
that “the extent of the restriction on property is not known and a regulatory
taking has not yet been established”196 until a regulatory agency has the
opportunity to explain the reach of a challenged regulation “using its own
reasonable procedures.”197 However, the court also stated that, “once it
becomes clear that the agency lacks the discretion to permit any development,
or the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of
certainty,” ripeness doctrine requires nothing further from a landowner.198
With this clarification, the Court placed two limitations on the finality ripeness
requirements.
The Court’s two limitations provide increased protection against the
procedural merry-go-round by enabling landowners to bring their regulatory
takings claims in court. The first limitation halts the operation of finality
ripeness only where agencies have no further discretion to exercise. Therefore,
it merely reaffirms the Court’s decision in Suitum.199 Because the permissible
uses of property can be known to a reasonable degree of certainty even where
an agency still possesses discretion,200 the second limitation offers landowners
protection beyond that provided by Suitum. This limitation on finality ripeness
requirements directs courts to hold claims to be ripe in two situations not
specifically covered by the Court’s previous decisions. In the first situation, an
agency might deny an application but also specify what development it will
195. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Co., 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). The Court
stated:
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its
assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of
development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine whether
a regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how far the regulation goes.
Id.
196. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2459.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See discussion at supra note 93 and accompanying text.
200. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2459. The importance of this limitation to the Court is
highlighted by the fact that the Court repeats it once again at the end of its ripeness discussion.
See id. at 2462.
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allow. Depending on the clarity and definiteness of the agency’s description, a
court should conclude that the extent of permissible development is known to a
reasonable degree and hold a takings claim to be ripe without requiring the
landowner to submit further applications. In the second situation, an agency
might require repeated submissions, never giving any indication as to what, if
any, development it will permit. Here, a court could reasonably conclude that
the agency did not intend to permit any development.201 Therefore, a
regulatory takings claim brought under such circumstances would be ripe
without requiring submission of additional applications.
The Court suggested that its two limitations, particularly the second,
should be read expansively when it indicated that pursuing variances and
multiple applications are not always necessary in order to know the extent of
permissible development. According to the Court,”[a]s a general rule, until [a
landowner has pursued variances and submitted additional applications] the
extent of [a] restriction on property is not known.”202 Because this is only “a
general rule,” there must be other ways by which the extent of restrictions may
be known.203 This enables courts to hold regulatory takings claims to be ripe
even where agencies still possess discretion as described in the two foregoing
scenarios.
Despite the limitations that Palazzolo places on finality ripeness
requirements, it may initially seem that the Court’s decision actually authorizes
agencies to establish more procedural requirements before allowing one to
bring a regulatory takings claim. The Court stated that “[t]he mere allegation
of entitlement to the value of an intensive use will not avail the landowner if
the project would not have been allowed under other, existing, legitimate land
use limitations.”204 The Court also indicated that it would not prohibit state

201. At oral arguments in Del Monte Dunes, some Justices indicated that such a conclusion
can reasonably be drawn. As one commentator has explained:
The hostility of some of the justices to the city’s position was apparent at oral argument
before the Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy took the city to task for seeking to deny Del
Monte Dunes a remedy for the city’s repeated denials of its application. Not to be
outdone in condemning the agency, Justice Scalia observed that the developer had
submitted five applications, each for a reduced development in response to a
recommendation by the agency, yet the agency denied each application in succession, and
then quipped, “isn’t there some point at which . . . you begin to smell a rat[?]”
Kendall, supra note 118, at 428.
202. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2459.
203. This statement harkens back to the dissent in MacDonald where Justice White argued
that “[a] decisionmaker’s definitive position may sometimes be determined by factors other than
[an agency’s] actual decision on the issue in question.” MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 359; see also
supra notes 77-78. Given that Justice White was arguing against a rule requiring repeated
applications, id., the Court’s implicit adoption of Justice White’s reasoning further indicates that
it endorses a more limited application of its finality ripeness requirements.
204. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2461.
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and local governments from requiring landowners to “follow normal planning
procedures” or bar them from “enact[ing] rules to control damage awards
based on hypothetical uses that should have been reviewed in the normal
course.”205 Such statements appear to grant government officials “the
opportunity to establish added protections against premature litigation.”206 As
one commentator explained:
[L]ocal officials may well interpret such “added protections against premature
litigation” language as a green light to pile more and more preconditions upon
landowners embarking on prolonged sets of negotiations with agency officials
with the goal of obtaining “final determinations” that themselves are
preconditions to state judicial review.207

While this analysis seems reasonable, the Court in Palazzolo also stated that
“[g]overnment authorities, of course, may not burden property by imposition
of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to avoid a final decision.”208
This statement removes any doubt that the Court’s decision sought to stop the
procedural merry-go-round that has threatened landowners’ rights.209
By limiting the finality ripeness requirements, Palazzolo protects
landowners’ rights in two ways. First, these limitations provide landowners
with greater access to courts by indicating that courts should hold claims to be
ripe under a greater set of circumstances. Simply securing substantive review
of their regulatory takings claims under the Fifth Amendment increases
protection for landowners’ constitutional rights. Second, greater access to the
court system also provides landowners with an important bargaining chip to
utilize in their negotiations with regulatory agencies.210 Legitimate threats to
bring claims in court will pressure regulatory agencies to engage seriously in a
process of negotiation and compromise with landowners, which will hopefully
lead to mutually acceptable resolutions outside of the court system. Agencies
will be motivated to use their discretion to the fullest extent possible in
adjusting the strictures of land-use regulations, which further protects
landowners’ rights.
While it offers landowners the promise of greater protection for their
rights, the vagueness of the Court’s ripeness decision in Palazzolo may leave
both landowners and regulatory agencies dissatisfied with the status of the
205. Id.; see also Echeverria, supra note 185. According to Professor Echeverria, agencies
“should carefully review their land use regulations to ensure that they clearly state that an
authorization is conditional upon meeting other applicable regulatory requirements.” Id.
206. Id.
207. Eagle, supra note 185, at 10131.
208. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2459.
209. Eagle, supra note 185, at 10132. According to Professor Eagle, this statement indicates
that “overreaching by localities might result in judicial invalidation of the unwarranted obstacles
to development that flourish under Williamson County.” Id.
210. See discussion at supra note 132.
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regulatory takings ripeness doctrine. Landowners’ primary complaint with the
Court’s decision will be that it does not provide the necessary definiteness or
clarity.211 Even if claims are considered ripe because the permissible uses of
property are known to a reasonable degree, regulatory agencies, relying on the
hazy standard of what is “reasonable,” might still require landowners to submit
multiple applications. This would defeat the Court’s attempt to provide
increased protection to landowners from the procedural merry-go-round.
Two considerations must be balanced against this criticism. First, this
criticism suggests only that regulatory agencies might not believe that the
Court’s decision truly grants landowners greater access to the courthouse, and
that, therefore, Palazzolo does not adequately increase landowners’ bargaining
strength. Even if true, this argument does not affect landowners’ actual access
to court, which an examination of the Court’s trend certainly indicates has
increased. Thus, Palazzolo still stands for increased protection by securing
substantive review of landowners’ regulatory takings claims.
Second, in order to respect the autonomy of regulatory agencies and allow
them to use their discretion, any judicially created standard of ripeness must be
fact-sensitive. Were the Court to limit arbitrarily the number of applications,
courts would risk intruding upon the decision-making processes of regulatory
agencies, thus crossing the boundary of proper judicial power. To achieve a
more definite standard of ripeness, the legislature must enact it.
The Court’s decision in Palazzolo may also create problems for regulatory
agencies. The lack of definiteness could enable landowners to bring a
regulatory takings claim before the extent of challenged regulations is truly
known. This in turn would provide landowners with disproportionate strength
in the negotiation process, permitting them to stymie the valid application of
regulations that do not go “too far.” Second, under a fact-sensitive standard of
ripeness a court might hear a claim before a regulatory agency is able to
exercise its discretion, which would transgress the bounds of proper judicial
power. Finally, were a court to decide a regulatory takings claim on the basis
of an incomplete factual record, it might hold a regulatory agency liable for
taking more of a landowner’s property than it actually would have taken if it
had been allowed to exercise its discretion.
While these threats to regulatory agencies are significant, a further
consideration ameliorates at least one of these shortcomings in the Palazzolo
decision. The final threat mentioned above would motivate regulatory agencies
to indicate exactly the extent of permissible development at the earliest
possible stage of the application process. Such forthrightness would save both
landowners and regulatory agencies time and money. Unfortunately, this does
211. Palazzolo certainly does not possess the definiteness or clarity of the failed federal
legislation. For a discussion of the substance of this legislation, see supra notes 136-37 and
accompanying text.
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not address the first two concerns, which are serious threats to the appropriate
distribution of power in a democratic system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s regulatory takings ripeness doctrine represents one
of the most significant threats currently facing the constitutional rights of
landowners. The Court’s ripeness decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island is its
most recent attempt to address the problems caused by the finality ripeness
requirements of its takings ripeness doctrine. While the Court’s decision in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island does not fundamentally change the regulatory
takings ripeness doctrine, it does change its “shade.” Therefore, it is a
significant takings ripeness decision.
Palazzolo’s significance rests in the fact that it reflects the Court’s growing
inclination to hold takings claims to be ripe. Initially, the Court’s takings
ripeness decisions sought to encourage negotiation by requiring landowners to
pursue variances and submit multiple applications. While these requirements
respected the autonomy and discretion of regulatory agencies, they also
threatened the legitimate rights of landowners by creating a procedural merrygo-round that prevented landowners from being able to bring a claim in court.
In response, the Supreme Court has attempted to provide landowners greater
protection by changing the “shade” of the regulatory takings ripeness doctrine.
Continuing the Court’s recent trend, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island reflects the
Court’s growing inclination to hold regulatory takings claims to be ripe. Given
the Court’s clarification of its takings ripeness doctrine, lower courts should
hold regulatory takings claims to be ripe under a wider range of circumstances.
By opening the courthouse door for landowners to litigate their regulatory
takings claims, Palazzolo offers increased protection for landowners’
constitutional rights. However, due to the shortcomings of the Court’s
decision in Palazzolo, it may ultimately leave both landowners and regulatory
agencies dissatisfied with the status of the takings ripeness doctrine.
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